I’m trying to create a web app that involves sharing of user-generated content, but one of the goals is that the service host operator should be blind to the content. Only authorized users should be able to see the content shared with them. This implies the content must be encrypted at rest, and users must hold custody of their private signing key.
I figure the situation requires an open source browser extension to hold onto a user’s keys and decrypt content for them. The web app would still be able to browse all of the site’s metadata, but any plaintext content must be siloed in the extension. The reason for using an extension is that the source code would be open source and independently verifiable, while building the same functionality into the web app would require trusting the host to serve the code you expect.
Do you think that’s a reasonable tradeoff or is this asking too much from users?
The other option would be just requiring users to download an open source app for content viewing.
EDIT: Perhaps an important followup: are you OK placing trust in the host to never access your confidential data if it means you don’t have to install additional client software or worry about verifying that client software’s authenticity?
IndexedDB is same-origin storage, readable by any script the origin serves. So the keys would not be safe from the host.
You already have to trust the site anyways. You had to let them give your browser instructions on what to do with the keys so you can use it for e2e communication. If you are not ok with that then stick to compilling OSS yourself